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Abstract 
The findings of this paper suggest another reason for capital structure adjustments besides the Trade-Off and 
Pecking Order theories propositions because asymmetric information impacts capital structure changes and 
deviations only for a quarter whilst stationarity impacts them for 4 quarters, even when controlled. Asymmetric 
information has been measured by Corwin-Schultz bid ask spread estimator and capital structure target as the 
mean of debt-to-equity ratio of 262 Nyse non-financial and non-regulated companies and their industries during 
91 quarters. The data were analyzed with Johansen-Fisher panel cointegration. The capital structure deviations 
last from 2 to 4 quarters and move toward a target. 
Keywords: capital structure adjustments, Corwin-Schultz bid-ask spread estimator, asymmetric information, 
Johansen-Fisher panel cointegration, dynamic trade-off theory, market microstructure 
1. Introduction 
1.1 The Problem 
The seminal works on capital structure (Modigliani & Miller, 1958; 1963; Myers & Majluf, 1984), optimal 
capital ownership structure (Jensen & Meckling, 1976), and stock market development (Demirgüc-Kunt & 
Maksimovic, 1996) that state the difference in quality and quantity of information among managers, investors, 
and informed and uninformed traders (Akerlof, 1970), have developed relevant roles in capital structure theories, 
either as an extremely rigid assumption of a perfect market or following hierarchical choices and tax shield 
issues.  
In capital structure adjustments (Leary & Roberts, 2005; Dang & Garret, 2015), asymmetric information has 
been studied as an important variable of capital structure adjustment toward its target (Byoun, 2008; Faulkender, 
Flannery, Hankins, & Smith, 2012; Dang, Kim, & Shin, 2014).  
However, there could be a void in studying capital structure adjustments with the use of a specific asymmetric 
information measure (Andres, Cumming, Karabiber, & Schweizer, 2014) beyond its effects, or proxies of 
differences of adjustment toward a target (Byoun, 2008; Dang & Garret, 2015). 
Considering this, the study of microstructure market theory (Hasbrouck, 1988; 1991; 2007) was undertaken that 
lead to the development of certain measures of asymmetric information (Roll, 1984; Easley & O´Hara, 1991), 
which were related to several relevant finance subjects (Easley, O´Hara, & Srinivas, 1998; Easley, Hvidkjaer, & 
O´Hara, 2002; Easley & O´Hara, 2004). Among such measures, the private information PIN Score (Easley, 
Hvidkjaer, & O´Hara, 2002) is a standard in literature, though it is occasionally restricted by the availability of 
intraday data and high computational challenges.  
As alternative to this standard, there is the high-low bid-ask spread estimator of Corwin-Schultz, a consistent and 
validated measure that simplifies the asymmetric information measurement (Corwin & Schultz, 2012a; 2012b) 
and has been studied in several methods (Maskara & Mullineaux, 2011; Lin, 2014; Zhang, Yang, Su, & Zhang, 
2014; Cerqueira & Pereira, 2014; Ripamonti, 2016) using companies’ data of the United States of America (the 
U.S.) for the period 1926 to 2014 (Corwin & Schultz, 2012b). 
The aim of this study is to examine capital structure adjustments using an asymmetric information measure, 
supposing that higher asymmetric information leads to a lower capital structure speed of adjustment (Modigliani 
& Miller, 1963). This hypothesis is based on the assumption that asymmetric information represents additional 
adjustment costs (Devos, Rahman, & Tsang, 2017) to the bond or stock markets.  
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In order to prevail over the effects of the stock market developments (Demirgüc-Kunt & Maksimovic, 1996; 
Demirgüc-Kunt, Feyen, & Levine, 2013), the sample is selected from the most liquid shares of non-financial and 
non-regulated NYSE companies, during a stipulated period of time, the data for which could be consistently 
examined (Johansen, 1988; Johansen, 1991) and controlled for the main determinants of capital structure 
(Titman & Wessels, 1988). 
1.2 Theoretical Framework 
1.2.1 Capital Structure Adjustments  
Several tests have been conducted on capital structure target and its behaviour, subsequent to Modigliani and 
Miller (1963). The biases of adjustment costs, macroeconomic conditions, and econometric estimation were 
found as the main determinants of capital structure speed of adjustments.   
Leary and Roberts (2005) found that capital structure adjustments significantly depend on costs, when compared 
to other variables. Similarly, Byoun (2008) observed that the existence of asymmetric information costs 
influence companies to adjust their leverage toward the target, and this influence is stronger when companies 
face a financial surplus or deficit, when the costs of issuing debt or stock rise or fall, as preconized by the 
pecking order theory.  
DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Whited (2011) found that the evolution of leverage reflects the sequence of 
investment outlays through a dynamic model which would replicate industry leverage better than other trade-off 
models. Dang, Kim, and Shin (2012) found that companies with large financing imbalances or investments, or 
low earnings volatility have a significantly faster adjustment speed toward heterogeneous leverage targets, 
considering that there are differential adjustment costs or asymmetric adjustments, depending on the firm’s 
characteristics. In addition, they developed a dynamic panel threshold model with the estimation approach 
combining time-series techniques and advanced methods for dynamic panels.  
Faulkender et al. (2012) mixed the effects of transaction costs and cash flow generation, and found that firms 
that generate larger cash flows have greater adjustment speeds. Dang, Kim, and Shin (2014) also documented 
that companies with high growth, large investments, small size, and volatile earnings reached higher speeds of 
adjustment of capital structure probably due to the lower adjustment costs that are shared with the transaction 
costs of accessing external capital markets. Lockhart (2014) found that a credit line is associated with 
cross-sectional variation in estimated speeds of adjustments of the target leverage because credit lines offer 
lower adjustment costs to under-levered firms. An, Li, and Yu (2015) state that the exposure to a crash-risk 
diminishes the issue of capital structure speed of adjustment.  
Considering Chang et al. (2015), product market competition leads companies with weak governance structures 
to increase the speed of adjustment of leverages. Halling et al. (2016) argue that the capital structure movements 
are counter-cyclical and determined by several variables. Li and Tang (2016) observed that the predominance of 
credit default swap-CDS referenced clients’ revenues determine the speed of capital structure adjustments as 
CDS dilutes information faster than credit ratings.  
Mu et al. (2017) found that the manager’s moral hazard could represent a significant variable that influences debt 
issue and the optimal capital structure. Oliveira et al. (2017) identified that the capital structure of a supplier 
changes two years before a bankruptcy and converts to an optimal one in the process of reorganization, which is 
consistent to the bargaining power theory. Seo and Chung (2017) observed that companies have adjusted their 
capital structure through equity repurchase, in order to increase the stock prices instead of changing or issuing 
new debt. In addition, financial distress and incentives to the managers are important variables for doing so.  
Sorokina et al. (2017) studied the reasons why the banks in the U.S. generally keep discretionary capital at 
higher levels, when compared to what regulations impose on them, suggesting that the banks’ capital structure 
have been influenced by traditional non-financial capital structure determinants, competition, loan portfolio 
diversification, and liquidity creation.  
Bakke and Gu (2017) found that diversification plays a significant role in cash holdings, investment, and the 
capital structure of industrial companies, which suggests a different variable for estimating companies’ leverage. 
Devos et al. (2017) examined the relationship between debt covenants and the speed of capital structure 
adjustments, and observed that these have a negative relationship, particularly in capital covenants and in 
companies with higher debt-equity ratios. Tao et al. (2017) tested the hypothesis of acquiring companies that 
consider an optimal capital structure during mergers or acquisitions, and found evidence consistent to the 
dynamic trade-off theory.  
Versmissen and Zietz (2017) found that there was a target for capital structure in the real estate industry and the 
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speed for rebalancing such a structure toward the target is faster (0.6 a year), when compared to other industries, 
probably due to the dividend payout policy and the tangibility of assets in companies.   
Cook and Tang (2010) observed that the speed of capital structure adjustment also depends on macroeconomic 
conditions, such as the term spread, default spread, gross domestic product - GDP growth rate, and dividend 
yield, although McMillan and Camara (2012) observed that multinational companies adjust their capital structure 
back to the target and lower than domestic companies, which could be related to return and leverage issues. 
However, Öztekin and Flannery (2012) confirmed that a country’s financial development affects capital structure 
adjustments in approximately half of the cases. Fier, McCullough, and Carson (2013) observed that there is a 
statistical relation between the deviations from target leverage and the activity of the internal capital markets in 
the property-casualty insurance industry.  
The macroeconomic conditions, such as the government leverage and output of financial sector from business 
credit and equity, have been found by Graham, Leary, and Roberts (2014) as the historical determinants of 
capital structures. An, Li, and Yu (2015) have indicated a positive association between capital structure speed of 
adjustment and transparent information environment.  
Considering banks, Lepetit, Saghi-Zedek, and Tarazi (2015) observed that banks with additional control rights, 
prefer drawing on earnings, in order to adjust their capital structure, mainly in countries with weaker shareholder 
protection or family-owned banks. Faulkender and Smith (2016) found empirical evidence that confirm the 
trade-off theory from the positive association between leverage and a country’s tax rate. Schepens (2016) found 
that a reduction in tax shields of debts improve the issue of equity, leverage ratios, and credit risks of Belgian 
banks, which is consistent to the static trade-off theory. Shah et al. (2017) tested the hypothesis of the efficiency 
of law courts associated with managers’ aversion to bankruptcy in a few countries, and found that the long-term 
leverage is negatively and significantly associated with the judiciary efficiency combined with the rights of 
creditors.  
However, they found that the efficiency of the judiciary is positively associated with such leverage. Mai, Meng, 
and Ye (2017) found that regional development in China is a determinant for capital structure speed of 
adjustment, after analysing 783 listed companies’ data from 2000 to 2014. 
Sabiwalsky (2010) estimated capital targets throughout nonlinear structural equation and show the biggest 
companies have time varying optimal capital structures. Hovakimian and Li (2011) argued that traditional 
methods overestimate the importance of target debt ratios and such a bias could be minimized by estimating debt 
ratios from historical fixed firm effect regressions, such as separately using target and lagged debt ratios, and 
using the coefficient on target debt ratio to test the trade-off theory, in a manner similar to the one used by 
Flannery and Hankins (2013), related to data base possible biases.  
Throughout the simulation process, Yang (2013) argued that including an increase in shareholders' strength 
improves the capital structure model specification. The challenges in model specification have been highlighted 
by Dang, Kim, and Shin (2015) in the robustness of results on capital structure adjustment studies. Liu et al. 
(2017) incorporated an incomplete information set in a learning model of the capital structure and found that the 
level of an agent’s learning is a relevant factor in maintaining debt under the optimal capital structure. Xu and 
Yang (2017) developed a model of real option considering the illiquidity risk of secondary debt markets and 
found that the optimal capital structure increases with liquidity constraints. 
1.2.2 Market Microstructure and Corwin-Schultz Estimator 
Market microstructure is the process by which investors’ latent demands are ultimately translated into 
transactions (Madhavan, 2000) or the study of trading mechanisms used for financial securities (Hasbrouck, 
2007). Asymmetric information is one of the most prominent themes in market microstructure (Hasbrouck, 
2007), and its relevance has a positive association with structural, technological, and regulatory improvements, 
and in areas of investments, financing, and capital structure (Madhavan, 2000).  
The trading activity in sequential and strategic trader asymmetric information models reveal part of the agent’s 
private information (Hasbrouck, 2007). 
Roll’s (1984) model uses the price of an asset to estimate the effective bid-ask spread, which contains the 
asymmetric information and is represented by the following equation: = 2√(-cov), where cov is the first-order 
serial covariance of price changes. French and Roll (1986) solved the minor sample bias of the former model to 
propose a new one, with the following equation: Spread= Var+ 2 cov. Several studies measure and offer 
improvements focusing on asymmetric information (Glosten & Milgron, 1985; Glosten & Harris, 1988; 
Hasbrouck, 1988; 1996; Hasbrouck, 1999) (Hasbrouck & Seppi, 2001; Hasbrouck & Saar, 2009; Roll & 
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Subrahmanyam, 2009; Hasbrouck & Saar, 2013). 
Another measure of asymmetric information is the probability of information-based trading–PIN, which was 
developed by Easley, Kiefer, and O´Hara (1997) and became a standard in financial literature. Such a measure is 
based on the level and first difference of intraday asset prices, quantity of buy and sell, as well as the algorithm 
of Lee and Ready (1991). Several studies have shown the relevance of asymmetric information on the main 
themes of finance (Easley, Hvidkjaer, & O´Hara, 2002; Easley, O´Hara, & Srinivas, 1998; Easley & O´Hara, 
2004; Chan, Menkveld, & Yang, 2008).  
In order to facilitate the computational process of asymmetric information, Corwin and Schultz (2012a) 
developed a bid-ask spread estimator from the daily high and low prices. Such a measure is based on the opening 
and closing, high and low prices of securities and has been presented in the following specification: 𝑆 = 2(𝑒𝛼−1)1+𝑒𝛼                                           (1) 𝛼 = √2𝛽−√𝛽3−2√2 − √ 𝛾3−2√2                                     (2) 𝛽 = 𝐸 {∑ [𝑙𝑛 (𝐻𝑡+𝑗0𝐿𝑡+𝑗0 )]21𝑗=0 }                                   (3) 
                                     (4) 
where the bid-ask spread estimator is based on (1), S is the spread, e is the natural logarithm (e basis) of x, α is 
obtained from (2), β from (3), and γ from (4), and H and L are the observed high and low stock prices, 
respectively. The authors tested their measure in several countries (Corwin & Schultz, 2012b) and made 
available the monthly/share stock market spreads for a wide range of shares in the U.S. They also derived their 
measure into a non-negative and overnight adjusted spread. The measures have been tested in abnormal returns, 
tangible economic gains and emerging markets, and for their consistency and financial reporting quality 
(Maskara & Mullineaux, 2011; Karstanje, Sojli, Tham, & Van Der Wel, 2013; Lin, 2014; Zhang, Yang, Su, & 
Zhang, 2014; Cerqueira & Pereira, 2014; Ripamonti, 2016). 
This study is significantly different from the studies on the standard in capital structure adjustments (Leary & 
Roberts, 2005; Byoun, 2008; Dang & Garret, 2015) as it promotes the substitution of capital structure estimation 
for the direct measurement of capital structure. In addition, the target is represented by the cross-section and 
industry average debt to equity ratio for the entire period, and the deviations computed from such an average and 
the debt to equity ratio of the former quarter. A proposition such as this has the specific goal of enriching the 
essential characteristics of debt to equity ratio (Granger, 1981; Sabiwalsky, 2010), and allows to completely 
capture such features through cointegration techniques (Granger, 2010) and as a new alternative to the 
assumption of asset, debt, or stock issuance adjustment (Dang & Garret, 2015). 
The sample used in this study consists of 264 non-financial and non-regulated NYSE companies’ data for 91 
quarters. Johanser-Fisher panel cointegration was implemented on this sample data. The findings show that the 
capital structure changes are negatively and significantly associated with asymmetric information, while the 
deviation from the cross-section and the industry’s capital structure targets are positively and significantly 
associated with asymmetric information. These two findings are consistent to the findings of other studies 
(DeAngelo, DeAngelo, & Whited, 2011; Hovakimian & Li, 2011; Dang, Kim, & Shin, 2012; 2014). 
This paper is divided method, that provides the characteristics of panel cointegration, and basic information on 
data and sample; results, with an analysis and discussion of the main findings; and concluding remarks, where 
the main theoretical and practical implications are presented. 
2. Method 
2.1 Johansen-Fisher Panel Cointegration 
Cointegration is a long run relationship with a short run error correction vector, among non-stationary variables 
through their residuals’ stationarity (Granger, 2010) and have been developed from unit root tests (Granger, 1981; 
Dickey & Fuller, 1981) through a single equation approach (Engle & Granger, 1987), multiple equation approach 
(Johansen, 1988; 1991), and Fisher-Johansen panel cointegration tests that allow for heterogeneity and multiple 
cointegrating vectors (Larsson, Lyhagen, & Lothgren, 2001).  
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Panel cointegration can be classified into residual-based and system panel cointegration tests (Örsal & Arsova, 
2017). The system tests allow the assessment of the number of ranks and the equation of a long run relationship 
between variables (Örsal & Arsova, 2017), and have been applied in several studies.  
Altunbas et al. (2016) applied the Westerlund panel cointegration techniques to ascertain that bank capital is 
positively associated with earning assets. Burret et al. (2016) also applied the Westerlund panel cointegration test 
to examine the financial sustainability of German states. 
On the other hand, Li and Lin (2016) applied the IPS, Fischer-augmented Dickey-Fuller-ADF, 
Fischer-Phillips-Perron-PP, CADF unit root tests, and Pedroni panel cointegration using the fully modified 
ordinary least squares-FMOLS estimation method to test the long-term relationship among energy patents, prices, 
and GDP in China. Liu and Zhang (2016) examined the different banking market developments and insurance 
activities in several countries using Fisher panel cointegration with generalized method of moments-GMM 
estimation method, and Ahmad et al. (2017) applied the Pedroni and Johansen-Fisher panel cointegration tests to 
estimate the long run relationship among foreign direct investments, house consumption, exchange rate, gross 
capital, and GDP in the Brazil, Russia, India and China- BRIC countries. 
Drakos et al. (2017) applied the dynamic panel cointegration model to assess the long run equation of savings 
and investments in 14 European Union countries, whereas Konopczak and Welfe (2017) applied three different 
kinds of panel cointegration models, including the Fisher-type Johansen test, in order to measure the long rung 
relationship among price, productivity, wages, and mark-up levels in four European countries. 
Finally, Lim and Basnet (2017) applied the Fisher-ADF to assess the stationarity and Pedroni’s panel 
cointegration tests to set the cointegration equation for GDP, consumption and remittances per capita, trade 
openness, and financial development of South-Asian countries, while Örsal and Arsova (2017) developed a new 
panel cointegration test based on individual likelihood ratios, and found reasonable properties, which were tested 
on a sample of exchange rates of developed and developing countries.   
In this study, the Johansen-Fisher panel cointegration model (Larsson, Lyhagen, & Lothgren, 2001) has been 
applied with an error correction model specification (5), where the panel’s maximum likelihood and trace tests 
can be obtained as the average of each cross-sectional test, even in the presence of heterogeneity (Örsal & 
Arsova, 2017), when compared to the likelihood ratio critical value asymptotic statistics from Larsson et al. 
(2001). In the vector error correction model-VECM specification without an intercept and a trend similar to (5), 
first part of the equation represents the variable’s short run error correction mechanism, second one refers to the 
long run relationship vector, and last one is the disturbance term. 
We gathered financial data from information services and the asymmetric information data from the 
Corwin-Schultz (2012b) supplementary materials. The data analysis has been made on Eviews9 (group statistics, 
Johansen cointegration test, test type – Fisher). 
                           (5) 
2.2 Sample and Data 
Data of 264 non-financial and non-regulated NYSE listed companies from the second quarter of 1994 to the 
fourth quarter of 2016 have been analysed. The sample considered only the most liquid shares in the respective 
composite index. Although financial companies are found (Sorokina, Thornton Jr, & Patel, 2017) to have the 
same non-financial determinants in their capital structure and identical capital structure targets, this study 
excluded these features as well as the regulated industries due to evident regulatory issues. 
The averages debt to equity ratio for the whole period of each cross-section and industry, have been considered 
as the target capital structure, as an alternative to literature on estimating the same (Leary & Roberts, 2005; 
Byoun, 2008; Dang & Garret, 2015). This choice intended to achieve the fundamentals of leverage variable 
(Granger, 1981; Sabiwalsky, 2010), in order to avoid increasing noisy residuals and also to allow a better 
cointegration estimation (Granger, 2010) that is beyond the control of different adjustments due to debt, assets, 
or equity (Dang & Garret, 2015). Another relevant issue is that standard capital structure estimation considers 
traditional determinants that are assumed to be control variables in this study.  
The actual capital structure has been computed based on the former, in order to measure the level of integration 
of asymmetric information on the variation of capital structure, without considering any target. 
The actual capital structure less the average of the whole period represents the deviation from the target capital 
structure and is intended to show how the adjustments behave for each company, particularly how the 
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asymmetric information could cointegrate.  
A similar theory has been applied to the industry capital structure target, as the average of each industry for the 
whole period has been used for the computation of deviation and to measure the impact of asymmetric 
information on adjustments.      
Corwin and Schultz (2012b) computed and published the asymmetric information measure from non-negative 
and overnight adjusted bid-ask spread estimator (S_2) for the U.S. stock market from the first quarter of 1926 to 
the fourth quarter of 2014. This study used the source of ―S_2‖ variable, in addition to different width as the 
Johansen-Fisher panel cointegration model allows for heterogeneity (Larsson, Lyhagen, & Lothgren, 2001). 
The variables used in the variation and deviation of debt to equity ratio, and that of asymmetric information 
variation have been analysed as model restricted variables (Johansen, 1988; 1991), while the traditional 
determinants of capital structure (Titman & Wessels, 1988) representing the growth opportunities set, size and 
return are entered into the model as unrestricted variables that control companies’ characteristics. 
 
Table 1. Variables 
Variable Description Measure 
1-VAR_DE Variation of debt/equity ratio 1 − (𝐷𝐸𝑖𝑡 𝐷𝐸𝑖𝑡−1)⁄  
DE-AV_ID_DE Deviation from the target 𝐷𝐸𝑖𝑡 − 𝐷𝐸𝑖𝑇  
DE-AV_IND_DE Deviation from the industry’s target 𝐷𝐸𝑖𝑡 − 𝐷𝐸𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑇  
S_2 Asymmetric information measure, CS bid ask spread estimator, non-negative and overnight 
adjusted 
Equation (1) 
MB Market-to-book ratio 𝑃𝑖𝑡/𝐵𝑂𝑂𝐾𝑖𝑡 
SIZE Size Ln (revenues) 
RETURN Variation of stock price 𝑃𝑖𝑡/𝑃𝑖𝑡−1 
Source: Author. 
 
2.3 Descriptive Statistics 
The variation in the mean capital structure was found to be 0.23 higher than the previous quarter, while such a 
movement clearly seems to be a forward company´s and industry´s target one, as the mean of deviation from 
both targets are close to zero, as presented in table 2. The asymmetric information measure was found to be 
approximately 0.02 per quarter, with a return of 0.13 per quarter - 6.99 for market to book ratio and 15.56 for 
size on an average. 
 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics 
Capital structure changes 1-VAR_DE S_2 MB SIZE RETURN 
Mean -0.235775 0.020539 6.993106 15.56039 0.132375 
Median 0.027360 0.017754 3.074481 15.51931 0.096802 
Maximum 1.000000 0.302415 9119.562 20.08545 14.66190 
Minimum -5.993.088 0.001921 0.000000 10.84805 0.000000 
Std. Dev. 8.562572 0.011957 108.8491 1.498549 0.201203 
Skewness -6.236.870 4.421949 72.41652 0.096376 44.07542 
Kurtosis 4077.528 56.07861 5791.788 2.629201 3136.291 
Jarque-Bera 6.01E+09 1047346. 1.21E+10 63.17069 3.55E+09 
Probability 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 
Sum -2.046.761 178.2979 60707.15 135079.7 1149.148 
Sum Sq. Dev. 636397.2 1.240986 1.03E+08 19492.23 351.3911 
Observations 8681 8681 8681 8681 8681 
Deviation from the target DE-AV_ID_DE S_2 MB SIZE RETURN 
Mean 1.02E-11 0.021373 6.430516 15.37679 0.100586 
Median -0.018024 0.017153 2.914039 15.36020 0.068355 
Maximum 141.9747 1.003980 9119.562 20.08545 14.66190 
Minimum -8.379.896 0.000786 0.000000 9.096029 0.000000 
Std. Dev. 1.556985 0.023746 82.83069 1.497936 0.152171 
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Skewness 50.84690 17.75668 81.93020 -0.027195 38.02522 
Kurtosis 4014.636 535.3066 8166.842 3.123412 3501.299 
Jarque-Bera 1.27E+10 1.30E+08 5.29E+10 14.43354 1.23E+10 
Probability 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000734 0.000000 
Sum 1.92E-07 234.9703 122379.2 292851.0 2416.469 
Sum Sq. Dev. 45713.18 6.198734 1.31E+08 42731.16 556.2736 
Observations 18858 10994 19031 19045 24024 
Deviation from the industry’s target DE-AV_IND_DE S_2 MB SIZE RETURN 
Mean 1.39E-11 0.021373 6.430516 15.37679 0.100586 
Median -0.067512 0.017153 2.914039 15.36020 0.068355 
Maximum 147.0882 1.003980 9119.562 20.08545 14.66190 
Minimum -3.266.409 0.000786 0.000000 9.096029 0.000000 
Std. Dev. 1.656336 0.023746 82.83069 1.497936 0.152171 
Skewness 49.66412 17.75668 81.93020 -0.027195 38.02522 
Kurtosis 3691.112 535.3066 8166.842 3.123412 3501.299 
Jarque-Bera 1.07E+10 1.30E+08 5.29E+10 14.43354 1.23E+10 
Probability 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000734 0.000000 
Sum 2.61E-07 234.9703 122379.2 292851.0 2416.469 
Sum Sq. Dev. 51733.24 6.198734 1.31E+08 42731.16 556.2736 
Observations 18858 10994 19031 19045 24024 
Note. Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of variables segregated into three different samples (capital structure changes, deviation from 
the target, and deviation from industry’s target). Capital structure changes refer to the sample with the variable [1-(debt/equity ratio of t / 
debt/equity ratio of t-1)]; deviation from the target is the sample with the variable (debt/equity ratio less average debt/equity ratio); and 
deviation from the industry’s target is with the variable (debt/equity ratio less industry average debt/equity ratio). Individual sample refers to 
statistics for all non-missing observations for each series and common sample is any of the series in the group. 
Source: Author. 
 
An increase in debt to equity ratio presented negative correlation to asymmetric information and returns, in 
addition to showing a positive correlation with market-to-book ratio and size. It can be assumed that asymmetric 
information has a relevant role in capital structure movements. A higher asymmetric information results in a 
higher adjustment toward a target, which is consistent to the theoretical framework. However, the deviation from 
the targets presented a positive correlation to asymmetric information. This confirms that the magnitude of 
asymmetric information generates deviations and subsequent adjustments on the capital structure of companies, 
including those related to their industries. 
 
Table 3. Correlation matrix 
Changes 1-VAR_DE S_2 MB SIZE RETURN 
1-VAR_DE 1.000000 -0.003873 0.000883 0.011009 -0.001573 
S_2 -0.003873 1.000000 -0.008882 -0.144852 0.218601 
MB 0.000883 -0.008882 1.000000 -0.010372 -0.007825 
SIZE 0.011009 -0.144852 -0.010372 1.000000 -0.094716 
RETURN -0.001573 0.218601 -0.007825 -0.094716 1.000000 
Target DE-AV_ID_DE S_2 MB SIZE RETURN 
DE-AV_ID_DE 1.000000 0.143493 -0.005553 -0.024306 0.033362 
S_2 0.143493 1.000000 -0.007668 -0.104191 0.231447 
MB -0.005553 -0.007668 1.000000 -0.004441 -0.006832 
SIZE -0.024306 -0.104191 -0.004441 1.000000 -0.068296 
RETURN 0.033362 0.231447 -0.006832 -0.068296 1.000000 
Industry DE-AV_ID_DE S_2 MB SIZE RETURN 
DE-AV_IND_DE 1.000000 0.204609 -0.005397 0.052270 0.042732 
S_2 0.204609 1.000000 -0.007668 -0.104191 0.231447 
MB -0.005397 -0.007668 1.000000 -0.004441 -0.006832 
SIZE 0.052270 -0.104191 -0.004441 1.000000 -0.068296 
RETURN 0.042732 0.231447 -0.006832 -0.068296 1.000000 
Note. Table 3 presents the correlation matrix of variables segregated into the three different samples described in table 2. 
Source: Author. 
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3. Results 
One of the main assumptions of a cointegration system (Granger, 1981; Engle & Granger, 1987) is that the 
restricted variables are not stationary (Johansen, 1988; 1991). Table 4 shows that the ADF-Fisher test (Larsson, 
Lyhagen, & Lothgren, 2001) rejects the null of no-cointegration for all the examined variables. This is confirmed 
by the MAX and TRACE tests (Johansen, 1991) in their panel cointegration version (Larsson, Lyhagen, & 
Lothgren, 2001), the results of which show the existence of several ranks of cointegration for the unrestricted 
model, suggesting that the relationship between the variables can be expressed in four cointegration equations, as 
shown in table 4.  
However, when the model is specified as a restricted one, where the capital structure changes or deviations with 
regard to the targets, asymmetric information are relevant variables, and when market-to-book M/B, size, and 
return are unrestricted and control variables, the Fisher-Rank test shows the existence of only one cointegration 
equation to explain such a relationship, as presented in Table 4.  
In addition, the results of unit root tests for capital structure changes and deviations from targets mean that the 
behaviour of the debt to equity ratio is at all times target forward, consistent to the trade-off theory (Modigliani 
& Miller, 1963); and the industry target is also expected to be attained, which could be due to competition issues 
(Chang, Chen, Chou, & Huang, 2015) or different sort of target estimation (Sabiwalsky, 2010).    
Combining such evidence with the optimal lag choice information criterion and the restricted model lags chosen 
from Table 4, it is possible to observe that the capital structure adjustments could occur between the second and 
fourth quarters.   
Model 1 in Table 4 presents the negative and significant association between capital structure changes and 
asymmetric information. Specifically, it refers to the increase of debt-to-equity ratio (in this case represented by 
more negative figures), which is determined by the increasing asymmetric information in the same period of time. 
This asymmetric information loses significance from the second to fourth quarter, although the variable 
debt-to-equity ratio keeps the significance for determining the whole system, in a clear stationary process.  
The inverted relationship sense of ―S_2‖ and the capital structure changes related to the actual quarter confirm 
―target forwarding‖ in the subsequent quarters. The capital structure changes or ―S_2‖ invert the signal of the 
first quarter, reinforcing the movement of capital structure adjustment toward a target.  
Similar results were found by Andres et al. (2014) for a NASDAQ sample, while applying a proxy for 
asymmetric information and examining the data for pooled, fixed, and random effects traditional panel data 
methods, for a different period when compared to this study.  
The influence of asymmetric information on capital structure adjustments is also consistent to the diminishing 
speed of adjustment in the disclosure environment as observed by An, Li, and Yu (2015) and the weak corporate 
governance structure (Grahan, Leary, & Roberts, 2014; Lepetit, Saghi-Zedek, & Tarazi, 2015). 
The findings of the capital structure changes are confirmed by models 2 and 3 in table 4. Considering the 
cross-section and industry cases, asymmetric information has a positive and significant role in the deviation from 
the target. However, the relationships and their significance follow the same path as the former one, with 
inversion in sense and loss of significance for asymmetric information.     
This study did not undertake a different estimation for the several financial crises. However, considering the 
findings of Cook & Tang (2010), it can be observed that the average deviations show similar behaviour in all 
situations, which could be explained by the easy access to the financial markets (Cook & Tang, 2010), liquidity 
of shares and stock market development (Demirgüc-Kunt & Maksimovic, 1996; Öztekin & Flannery, 2012), and 
the internal financial market (Fier, McCullough, & Carson, 2013). The influence of financial crises is also 
consistent to the dynamics of capital structure (DeAngelo, DeAngelo, & Whited, 2011; Hovakimian & Li, 2011) 
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Table 4. Unit root tests, rank test, and VECM estimates 
UNIT ROOT TESTS 
Method Variables 
  1-var_de de-av_id_de de-av_ind_de S_2 MB SIZE RETURN 
LLC 0.0000 0.0036 0.0036 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 
Breitung 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.4858 0.6232 0.0000 
IPS 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
ADF-Fisher 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
PP-Fisher 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
FISHER RANK TEST 
Unrestricted 4 4 4   
Restricted 1 1 1   
VECM ESTIMATES 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
  coef. t-stat coef. t-stat coef. t-stat 
Cointegration equation   
1-VAR_DE 1.000000   
DE-AV_ID_DE 1.000000   
DE-AV_IND_DE 1.000000   
S_2 -3501.4790 -23.3519 4624.9760 29.6729 -1060.9290 -30.1322 
Constant 72.362730 -94.773000 21.727970   
Error correction   
1-VAR_DE (-1) -0.970772 -82.947700   
1-VAR_DE (-2) -0.948017 -59.206400   
1-VAR_DE (-3) -0.931384 -48.360600   
1-VAR_DE (-4) -0.453148 -11.365700   
DE-AV_ID_DE (-1) 0.288184 24.782900   
DE-AV_ID_DE (-2) -0.247474 -19.446900   
DE-AV_IND_DE (-1) 0.288559 24.806700 
DE-AV_IND_DE (-2) -0.247277 -19.437000 
S_2 (-1) -5.855850 -0.388360 1.781973 2.765120 1.656769 2.563310 
S_2 (-2) 4.935737 0.333660 0.607971 0.973300 0.514763 0.823070 
S_2 (-3) -7.138713 -0.062563   
S_2 (-4) 9.885883 0.718910   
Constant -0.629853 -0.560350 -0.053984 -1.150540 -0.565270 -1.204120 
MB 0.000044 0.049160 -0.000007 -0.147750 -0.000007 -0.146300 
SIZE 0.033915 0.475440 0.004531 1.501180 0.004715 1.561420 
RETURN -0.150082 -0.291960 -0.095939 -3.864030 -0.098357 -3.963400 
    
 R-squared  0.487677  0.099638  0.099717   
 Adj. R-squared  0.486891  0.098843  0.098922   
 Sum sq. resids  647387.6  1842.948  1842.786   
 S.E. equation  9.099853  0.450992  0.450972   
 F-statistic  620.1599  125.3409  125.4518   
 Log likelihood -28398.07 -5642.771 -5642.371   
 Akaike AIC  7.256052  1.246256  1.246168   
 Schwarz SC  7.267616  1.253314  1.253226   
 Mean dependent  0.005393  0.003695  0.003695   
 S.D. dependent    12.70368    0.475082    0.475082   
Note. Table 4 presents the unit root tests, maximum likelihood and trace statistics, and cointegration equations for the restricted models 
containing capital structure changes, deviation from the cross-section target, and deviation from the industry target. The unit root tests have the 
null of no-cointegration of variable time series and present the p-values of the tests for each variable. The Fisher rank test presents only the 
number of cointegration equations where the maximum likelihood and trace statistics converge, and where the number of cointegration 
equations jointly explain the relationship. ―Unrestricted‖ refers to the models with five variables, and ―restricted‖ is related to models with two 
restricted variables and three unrestricted ones. The relationship between restricted variables has been chosen from the Akaike and Schwarz 
Bayesian information criterion, with four lags for capital structure changes and two lags for deviation from the targets. VECM estimates present 
the long run relationship coefficients and its correction in the short run, all with coefficient followed by their t-statistics for checking the 
significance of the results. 
Source: Author. 
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4. Discussion 
The impact of asymmetric information is significant, both in the capital structure changes and in the deviations 
of a company’s or industry’s capital structure targets. However, such a long run relationship is strongly 
influenced by its own capital structure movement. 
Further, the dynamic trade-off theory is improved from two aspects. First, beyond the seminal works of tax 
shield and bankruptcy risk, the deviations and subsequent movement toward a target are influenced by 
asymmetric information that could be captured by a measure that is easy to compute and available. Second, the 
power of capital structure stationarity has to be considered in the model specifications. The influence of 
deviations from the target lasted for approximately four quarters, while the influence of another variable in the 
restricted model lasted for a single quarter. The dynamics of the capital structure warranted model specifications 
related to other variables in asymmetric information and traditional capital structure determinants. Such a finding 
relates to the pecking-order theory, where asymmetric information is among its foundations.  
In financial market activities, particularly in portfolio selection, this study’s findings suggest the monitoring of 
the asymmetric information measure. Despite being significant in only one quarter, the capital structure 
movements can be predicted, and consequently, the companies’ strategic issues can be observed in advance, in 
addition to the managers’ competing interests.  
Panel cointegration appears to be a reliable model for assessing firm level capital structure decisions as well. It 
aligns the strength of panel data, generally applied in financial studies, to the powerful dynamics of time series. 
Such models could be useful in analysing several aspects of a capital structure.  
The initial supposition of this study that asymmetric information has a relevant role in capital structure 
adjustments, seems to be confirmed. Furthermore, it was possible to find other prospects in the dynamics of 
funding decisions.  
Certainly, the findings could be improved from different aspects, such as the inclusion of macroeconomic 
conditions, and developing markets and measures of capital structure adjustment on the models. 
Therefore, this research has implications and innovations in some aspects, such as the estimates and analysis of 
capital structure adjustments, validation of the easy way of measuring asymmetric information and its 
consequences on the theoretical framework and an additional tool for the investors to forecast companies´ 
strategic decisions.  
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